Ben Wallace: In the past, whatever we thought of the regime running Iran, the EU3 plus 3 countries recognised that it ruled by some form of consent. In light of the recent elections, does the Foreign Secretary believe that the new president—or President Ahmadinejad—rules by consent? If not, how can we begin negotiations to solve problems to do with the middle east or the nuclear issue?

Edward Balls: I know the director of children's services, Ms Joe Davidson, very well. She has done a lot of work with us on the child and adolescent mental health agencies review. The council's officers have engaged with the national challenge very well, but that does not mean that we are not concerned about the lack of sufficient progress in schools below the threshold, or about the lack of leadership, or about the structural change that we think may be necessary. The right thing for me to do is to send in Mr. Graham Badman to give us a report. We should not be complacent: we should get the report done and then see whether we need to do more.

Bob Spink: I welcome the Secretary of State's statement, his September guarantee and his commitment to education, which is clear for everyone. Will he step in to stop Essex county council closing one of Castle Point's six secondary schools, given that we have waiting lists for our secondary schools, thousands more houses promised to be built—against the borough's wishes—and the leaving age for compulsory education increased from 16 to 18?

Jack Straw: Not me.
	The issue particularly exercising the Clerk and Members was clause 6, which I have dealt with.  [Interruption.] Well, we can deal with that we come to clause 10. As I recall, it is the nationalist parties that were keen to ensure that offences were written directly into the Bill, so there is the consequent issue about how to adduce evidence.

David Heathcoat-Amory: My hon. Friend makes an historical illusion, which is relevant because a part of our history—certainly of the history of this place—is an attempt to keep royal power at bay; so, again, it is rather puzzling that we are importing into this Bill, quite unnecessarily in my view, a system of royal appointment.
	I suspect that the truth is that this is a kind of proxy for the Executive. They want to appoint the chair and members of this new quango. So my question to the Secretary of State is: what does this bring to the party? If it has no effect, why are we doing it? If it does have an effect, what is it? I certainly believe that this House is perfectly capable of making these appointments, if they are necessary, without having the additional rigmarole of making them Crown appointments.
	I am grateful to the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means for correcting the misprint on the amendment paper, because Amendment 52 deals with line 23, not line 3. Such misprints are rare, and I think that this was another example of the fact that this is rushed legislation. The amendment leaves out part of paragraph 5 that deals with the removal from office of members of IPSA. The Bill says that such a removal may be carried out by Her Majesty the Queen—I think she has quite enough to do without having that duty as well—and that any such removal must be done
	"on an address of both Houses".
	I am not sure why both Houses need to be involved, because I understood that this Bill was about this House. Why are importing into the Bill the requirement that the Leader of the House of Lords should also table a motion in another place to bring about such a removal? Is this because, as I suspect, IPSA is in due course to cover the whole of Parliament, not just this House?
	My amendment 52 would alter the procedure within this House and would mean that the motion for an address could not only be moved by the Leader of the House. To put it another way, my amendment would remove the requirement that such an address can be moved only by the Leader of the House and by the Leader of the House of Lords in another place. My amendment seeks to remove that requirement because I am worried that only the Government can do this. I think it is much better to leave the matter open, so that other Members—perhaps the Speaker—can, if the rules allow it, move such an address to make those removals should they be required.
	Finally, I come to my amendment 53, which relates to funding.

Edward Garnier: May I ask the Secretary of State one or two questions that arise from the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin)? They relate to the sub-paragraph of the schedule—paragraph 1(2)—that deals with the need to have a member of the judiciary, past or present, on the IPSA.
	It seems a matter of concern that we should be permitting an arrangement whereby a current member of the senior judiciary becomes involved in what will, in many respects, be an acutely political environment. The IPSA, of course, will no doubt do its best to act in a dispassionate and judicial way, but the subject matter of its deliberations must by its very nature be acutely political. Indeed, that subject matter will not just be capital "p" political, but party political. We need to be extremely careful about drawing current members of the judiciary into the arena. Perhaps, on better consideration, if we are to have a person of judicial experience on the body, it should be a retired judge and not a sitting judge. However, I do think that some legal experience is sometimes helpful.
	I appreciate that not all Members of Parliament always agree, and I also understand that the Lord Chancellor takes a different view from mine on the construction of certain parts of the Bill, particularly in relation to clause 9 and how we define dishonesty. We can perhaps discuss that tomorrow, when I shall do my best to correct him.

Bernard Jenkin: I confess that, perhaps naively, I took sub-paragraph (2) to mean that it was intended that a person who held judicial office at the time of his appointment to the IPSA would relinquish that office. If that is not clear, it should be made clear. I hope that that is the Government's intention and that, if necessary, they will table a Government amendment to clarify matters. In addition, does my hon. and learned Friend agree that a person with experience of high juridical office would be more objective and less likely to be infected by party political matters than, say, a former civil servant?

Edward Garnier: That is one of the skills of being a judge. I have no doubt that any current judges who had the misfortune to be appointed to this body would do their best to apply their judicial skills, but that is not the point. Judges must be separated from politics, and seen to be so. We do not have a written constitution in this country, but whether those who prefer a written constitution like it or not, we do have a separation of powers. Importing current judges on to political bodies of this nature would be a mistake.
	The other point that flows from the amendment is that there are statutory limits on the numbers of people who may serve as judges in the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. It is not widely known—and even where it is known, it is often ignored—that those people are already fairly fully employed. Taking a serving judge off the current bench of senior judges would simply add delay to the existing criminal and civil jurisdictions, and place additional work on the backs of the current judiciary at a time when they have plenty to do already. There are only two logical conclusions: either that sub-paragraph (2) be deleted, as advocated in amendment 61, or that membership of the IPSA should be restricted to retired or former senior judges.

Dominic Grieve: I want to say a few words about the amendments, and the Opposition's view of these matters. My hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) has tabled two amendments that are important in that they give proper consideration to the issue of judicial appointments, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) has explained. There seems to be good reason for having someone of legal experience on the IPSA, but I also think that the point made by my hon. and learned Friend is correct. I find it very difficult to imagine how a person in high judicial office, with some time in post still to run, would want to spend his or her later years on the judicial bench—or the years after leaving it—as a member or the chairman of the IPSA. It strikes me as a job that, although it may have some interest, is unlikely to match the interest generated by working on the bench.

Dominic Grieve: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. I would not have thought that the uncertainties about the structure of the IPSA would encourage people of sensible disposition who wish to be of public service to apply to join it. I do not wish to stray from the amendment, but we touched on one of the unfortunate aspects of the matter yesterday when we noted the degree of incoherence in how we have proceeded with this legislation. Even the bits that we support—I shall say more about them in a moment—seem to us deficient, as we cannot see the entire structure because we do not have Sir Christopher Kelly's report.
	There are good arguments for saying that the IPSA should have a person with legal experience serving on it. If that is to be a retired High Court judge, so be it, but the point has been made that a person who has an active career in the judiciary should not be included in the list, and I rather think that that was not what the Secretary of State intended.

Dominic Grieve: There again, having someone of legal experience on the investigatory side may be desirable—clearly not a serving High Court judge or someone who is likely to go back on the Bench. There are arguments that someone of legal experience would be valuable. I happen to think that legal experience would be valuable in either role. I shall be interested to hear from the Secretary of State what he has to say on the subject.
	There are two slightly different roles. One is clearly investigatory and involves making sure that due process of law is followed, so judicial experience is relevant, especially in view of the comments made by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) about the human rights compatibility of the new statute. Equally, there may well be some scope for judicial experience within the IPSA, if for no other reason than that if one gets the right person it will help inject common sense and may be of assistance in justifying decisions to the public independently of the House. For those reasons, I shall be interested to hear what the Secretary of State has to say.
	The second set of amendments has been tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory) on the question of royal appointments. There is something slightly strange here. On the one hand, the Bill makes it clear that the appointment is made by this House voting on a motion, but is ratified by the Queen. On the other hand, later in the Bill, the person who is appointed is described as not being a Crown servant. I find a slight incompatibility between an appointment that derives from the monarch and the appointee not being a Crown servant. I shall be interested to hear from the Secretary of State exactly what the legal status of that person will be.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend makes an important point. The difficulty that the House has, and we have to face up to it, is that either the IPSA is our creature in the sense that it is ultimately answerable to us, or it is not. As I said on Second Reading, I have grave anxieties about the widening of the scope of the IPSA's operation, especially to issues of MPs' conduct. That is in a sense a separate issue that we will have to consider tomorrow, although it will colour my view about the entirety of the legislation.
	If the purpose of establishing the IPSA is to set up a system for setting our salaries and allowances and ensuring that they are properly paid and that we repay what might have been misclaimed, the arguments for creating a body that is seen to be entirely independent of the House become strong. I have to say that we have got ourselves into our difficulties in part because we have in-house allocation of our allowances and we ultimately control them.
	I am sympathetic to the Government's aim, as I made clear at the outset, of having our salaries and allowances set outside this place entirely. If we are to achieve that, it must follow that the IPSA cannot be seen to be our creature. If it is appointed on the basis of motions in the House, it will remain so. That is the point where I have sympathy with the Government's position. That sympathy begins to erode when I see how the Government have provided for the IPSA to have other functions and, above all, for the commissioner to have other functions which I believe intrude into areas of conduct, affect the Bill of Rights and our privileges, and are much more controversial.
	The question that I would like the Secretary of State to answer is: in view of what the Bill says—namely, that the appointment is made by motion of this House but is ratified by the Crown—what is the status of the person who is thus appointed if they are not a Crown servant? On the face of it, it seems rather an anomalous position.

Jack Straw: This has been a useful debate, and I am grateful to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen for having raised issues. Let me deal with them in turn. The hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) asked, first, whether it was appropriate for there to be a place on the authority for somebody who has held high judicial office; secondly, whether it is acceptable, in any circumstances, to hold out the possibility of that person being a current holder of high judicial office; and, thirdly, whether it would be more appropriate for somebody in that position to be the person selected to be commissioner.
	On whether it would be very useful for there to be one person on the authority who has high judicial experience, certainly there was not much argument in the inter-party talks, although I accept that they were not a substitute for debate in this House; of course they were not. My view is that given the nature of the functions of the authority, somebody with high judicial experience could be extremely helpful in helping to guide the authority. There is no direct parallel, but I have certainly witnessed at close hand the work that former members of the Court of Appeal have done as commissioners for the interception of communications, for surveillance and for the intelligence services. They do a job that is partly administrative and partly adjudicatory, and they do it with huge skill, perspicacity and authority. We are trying to set up an authoritative body that is at arm's length from the House, and that does not leave us open to the criticism that we are judging ourselves, so having someone with that authority on the body would be very helpful.
	I say to the hon. Member for North Essex that the authority will have two functions, which are set out in one of the clauses. One of the functions is to run the administrative system—that is, to administer the allowances and so on. The execution of that system will be a matter for the chief executive. Alongside that, but quite separately, there is the function of adjudicating on complaints that are brought to the body by the commissioner. In certain circumstances, the body will deal with the complaints; in other circumstances—if it judges the complaints to be more serious—it will refer them to this House. Again, when it comes to ensuring that there is an acceptable process that meets the requirements of natural justice and of article 6 of the European convention on human rights, it would be helpful to have somebody on the IPSA with the authority of high judicial experience.
	On the hon. Gentleman's second point, he is quite right to suggest that it is improbable, not to say impossible, that somebody who is currently serving as a senior judge could or should accept appointment to the IPSA. The only circumstances that I can conceive in which the current wording would be relevant are those in which someone who is coming to the end of their term of office, and is about to retire, wishes to apply for the IPSA job. He or she might be appointed to it while still holding high judicial office, but would not take the job on until they had finished their term of office. However, if I may, I will take away the issue of the current drafting and think about it.
	On the third point, which was about whether it would be more appropriate for the commissioner to be somebody who had held high judicial office, there is nothing to stop somebody who has judicial experience from applying for the post. It is important that a member of the authority should have held high judicial office, but I can think of others who have had good judicial experience who could easily fulfil the work of the commissioner.

Jack Straw: Such is the eloquence of the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young) and my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Sir Stuart Bell) that I am very happy to accept the amendment. It makes eminent sense and shows the value of this kind of process.
	 Amendment 3 agreed to.
	 Amendments made: 4, in schedule 1, page 16, line 28, after 'and', insert 'the Speaker must'.
	Amendment 5, in schedule 1, page 16, line 30, leave out 'On laying' and insert 'When the Speaker lays'.— (Sir George Young.)
	 Schedule  1,  as amended, agreed to.

Edward Garnier: I agree. It has long been my view that while we have an Executive who sit in Parliament, they should not sit on Parliament. We have become too supine as Members of Parliament. I hope that, in recognising the public anger about expenses and so forth, we will none the less remember that we were elected to represent our constituents in a self-confident and independent way, and not to be bullied by either the Executive or other outside interests that wish to knock us off our stride.
	Of course Members of Parliament make mistakes. Some may have committed serious mistakes and will have to answer to the law for them. However, I cannot understand an argument that says that we are setting up an independent machinery when one sees, for example, references to the Speaker in paragraphs 1(2), (3) and (4) of schedule 2, references to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which is made up of Members of Parliament, or references in paragraph 4 of schedule 2 to the removal of the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations being brought about only on a motion put down by the Leader of the Commons—[Hon. Members: "They've conceded that."]

Douglas Hogg: Once the rules are in place, who will be able to get rid of them? Will it be only the IPSA, or will the House also be able to do so?

Jack Straw: It might help if I explain the basis on which we propose the Speaker's Committee. We took into consideration the parallel experience of the Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission. I have served on that committee—as Leader of the House, I think, and certainly as Justice Secretary.
	I understand the anxiety of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) about these Committees being taken over by the Executive, but the Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission is chaired by the hon. Member for Gosport (Sir Peter Viggers) and is operated on a very collaborative basis. If we are talking about a Public Bill Committee on a contentious piece of legislation, then, yes, of course the Whips will influence the Committee of Selection, but for this kind of Committee, the individuals selected to serve on it do so because of their commitment to this House and, in this case, to the Electoral Commission—and it has worked extremely well. I have no reason to think that that should not also be the case here.
	I do not accept what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says about Leaders of the House, and I am not just speaking for myself, but for other Leaders of the House. As I have witnessed, they have stood up for the interests of the House not just here, but inside Government—repeatedly and assiduously—as well.
	We are always open to suggestions for improvement, but paragraph 1 of schedule 3 provides that of eight members, only one can be a Minister of the Crown—it would be the Leader of the House. I will give further consideration to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's suggestion to have some requirement to ensure a balance between the parties.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Schedule 3 agreed to.

Alan Duncan: I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) on tabling the amendment. It has considerable merit, being both ingenious and uncontentious. It contains a lot of sense and I hope that the Government will see fit to accept it.
	The purpose of the Bill is to set up an independent Fees Office designed to administer and set allowances. In its current proposed form, it is designed to administer—that is to say, pay—salaries. In the long term, we want to ensure that everything that is paid to Members of Parliament, be it pensions, salary or allowances, is determined by an outside body rather than by ourselves. As the Bill stands, it goes only some way towards doing that, but the amendment would take us a marginal step further in the direction of having an outside body determine our salary. Crucially—and sensibly, at this awkward time—as well as removing Members from the process, it would prevent the Executive from inevitably attempting to intervene to reject the recommendation of the SSRB or to amend it. As such, it would introduce a measure of automaticity into the way in which our pay is adjusted and prevent the contentious political shenanigans that bedevil this issue.
	The two resolutions in question are the one that was passed on 3 July last year and the accompanying money resolution. The amendment would entrench the adjudication of any increases that follow. It would link our pay to a package of comparators, including public service workers—in the NHS, school teachers, the armed forces and the civil service, including HMRC—and it would also introduce an annual review. In making that link, it would not only remove many of the contentious arguments about how much we should be paid, but prevent the political intervention that normally follows.
	We should be realistic and accept that the regime set up by the amendment would be an interim measure. The Bill does not allow for the external assessment and setting of our pay, so the amendment would be in place until the primary legislation was amended. If in future we were to bolt on to this Bill a broader responsibility to consider the entire pay and rations of Members of Parliament, and potentially Ministers, this interim regime would be replaced by giving the IPSA responsibility for setting our pay, allowances and pension.
	The amendment would set up an effective, depoliticising and interim regime that would do much to improve the basis on which our pay is set, and as such it is entirely in the spirit of the Bill. I urge the Committee to support the amendment.

Alan Duncan: May I respectfully point out that even if Sir Christopher Kelly and his committee made recommendations about salaries, the Bill in its present form would not give IPSA the power to do anything about them? The amendment would provide an anchor, or foundation, for the salary issue, on which Sir Christopher Kelly's recommendations on allowances could fit, along with the recommendations of the Senior Salaries Review Body. If we needed to do anything abut salaries in the future, there would need to be an amendment to this primary legislation in any event, which could amend my hon. Friend's proposal and do something about salaries at the same time.

Barbara Keeley: My hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has already put very well the point that I want to make. We should not pre-empt the Kelly review, we should tie the issue of pay to a single set of resolutions of the House, and we should not agree to what we see as temporary legislation in circumstances in which we can forge for the future.

Dominic Grieve: I appreciate that point, and I hope that it would have to follow automatically that IPSA did that. However, in proposed new subsection (3), the hon. Gentleman wants IPSA to
	"provide general guidance to Members on relevant principles and considerations of due parliamentary standards to be reflected in the preparation and submission of their tax returns, in particular as they relate to property, items or benefits funded or part-funded by the Members of Parliament's allowances".
	That is where I think that a much greater difficulty arises. It seems to me to be turning IPSA into one's accountant, and I am not sure that that is the right role to request of it. IPSA will be placed in a difficult situation when it comes to the question of whether it is there to advise MPs on how they should best go about their taxation business to minimise tax or to advise them on the standards of morality that should apply to their tax returns. Those are two rather different things.

Robert Smith: On proposed new subsection (2), it seems to be good employment practice for someone who is providing allowances to ensure that the Member—or employee in any situation—is provided with accurate and effective information from which to make their tax return.

Nicholas Soames: In a long and highly competitive field, this is by any stretch of the imagination a very foolish Bill. That is exemplified by clause 3, and I wish to support amendment 69, moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie), on including the Committee on Standards in Public Life in the consultation process.
	Sir Christopher Kelly is a mild-mannered and sensible man, but if I were him I would be outraged that I had not been consulted by the Government. He has already started his work, but to some extent that has been negated by the introduction of this very foolish Bill, which is designed purely to show that the Prime Minister is doing something. If I were Kelly, I would be extremely angry as well that the Bill had been introduced after I had started the inquiries that the Prime Minister had asked me to undertake. Amendment 69 is absolutely essential to the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will take what steps she can to see that it is included.
	Incidentally, I believe that the Government tried to consult on this matter. I was present at two pre-legislative meetings that the Minister attended, at which it was clear that the Government were trying to accept amendments and arrive at a consensus. However, to exclude the Committee on Standards in Public Life from the provisions of clause 3 is insulting and—much worse—incredibly foolish.

Barbara Keeley: My job is quite an easy one because we intend broadly to accept the amendments. We are discussing amendments to clause 3, which sets out the authority's duties in setting the scheme for MPs' allowances and lays an obligation on the authority to prepare a scheme, review it regularly and revise it as appropriate. The authority is obliged to consult a number of bodies about the scheme. That already includes the Leader of the House, the Speaker, any committee of the House nominated by the Speaker, the review body on senior salaries, the Treasury and others, but hon. Members have tabled some useful amendments in this short debate. I thank the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith), the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve)—the shadow Justice Secretary—and the hon. Members for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie), for Foyle (Mark Durkan), for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) and for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) for their contributions on amendments 68, 26 and 71, which we shall be happy to accept.
	The Committee on Standards in Public Life was not included in the list of consultees. It may be necessary to consult it at the moment, but it may not be in the future. It may not be looking at matters that affect IPSA. However, the hon. Member for Chichester made a good case for including that body, and we are happy to accept amendment 68.
	A number of points have been made about the need to consult Members of this House, and we are prepared to accept amendment 26. What we were seeking to do in not including hon. Members in the list was to avoid burdening the consultation process and making it too lengthy, but as hon. Members have just said, there are differences between Members. London Members are different from Members in other parts of the country in terms of, for instance, their staffing allowances. So there are issues to consult Members about, and we accept that point.
	It is clear that matters relating to HM Revenue and Customs have been serious issues, as the hon. Member for Foyle said, and I am sure that it would be appropriate to consult HMRC, so we shall accept amendment 71.
	We accept the principle that the hon. Member for Foyle has outlined in new clause 10, but we shall need to look at the drafting so, if it is acceptable to him, we shall do that and table a similar new clause later in the proceedings.
	Once the IPSA has drawn up the scheme, it will be laid before the House and it will reflect the amendments.
	 Amendments made: 68, in clause 3, page 2, line 11, at end insert—
	'( ) the Committee on Standards in Public life'. — (Mr. Tyrie.)
	Amendment 26, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
	'(ca) members of the House of Commons.'. (Mr. Grieve.)
	Amendment 71, page 2, line 15, at end insert—
	'(da) HM Revenue and Customs,'. (Mark Durkan)
	Amendment 1, page 2, line 18, leave out 'IPSA' and insert 'Speaker'.— (Sir George Young.)

Edward Leigh: Is there not an inconsistency in logic here? On the one hand, we are saying that we should accept whatever IPSA imposes; on the other hand, the Government have been careful to say that they will not necessarily accept what Kelly proposes—in other words, we will be prepared for a little bit of pain, but perhaps not too much from an external source.

David Heathcoat-Amory: That is exactly the point that I am making. We may or may not accept the Kelly recommendations; we have discretion on that. However, under the terms of the Bill, we have to accept the scheme brought forward by IPSA. To conclude the point that I was making, in another letter, dated 30 March, the Prime Minister went on to repeat the point about the breadth of the Kelly inquiry:
	"I am keen you should not feel bound in your discussions but free to consider a wide set of issues".
	The Government could not have been clearer. The Kelly inquiry is looking into everything, including the structure of the allowances and the content of the scheme, yet we are legislating for such a scheme in the Bill.
	When pressed, the Justice Secretary conceded earlier today that future legislation might be required, so this is only an interim Bill. I think that he is already retreating from his earlier remarks, if I interpret his body language rightly, but they are on the record. He must concede that there is a conflict between setting up an inquiry into everything, as required by the Prime Minister, and prejudging that inquiry in a Bill that is being rushed through the House in a week. There is nothing that I can do to rescue the Government from that collision except try to throw the Bill out, which I tried to do yesterday by voting against it.
	However, through my amendment 56, I could at least prevent the House from having to accept the scheme of allowances that IPSA will bring forward under clause 3. It is required, under the Bill, to bring forward a scheme of allowances, and we do not have any say on it; we have to accept it. Again, there is a conflict between the Kelly inquiry findings, which we may or may not accept, and the terms of the Bill, which require the House to accept the scheme that the IPSA must present.
	I believe that the House must have the last word on such matters. That is desirable both because we are a sovereign Parliament and must decide the rules and be accountable for them, and because, as I have explained, that would give us discretion if the Kelly inquiry brought forward rules and suggestions that were incompatible with those that we have to accept from IPSA, under the Bill as drafted. That is why I ask the Government to accept amendment 56.
	My second amendment, 57, proposes that any scheme of allowances that is proposed, agreed and accepted by us should come into effect only after an election. As I mentioned yesterday on Second Reading, I borrowed the idea from the 27th amendment to the United States constitution. I will not weary the Committee with a long history of that amendment; it is a very long history. It took more than 200 years for that amendment finally to be ratified. It was first proposed in the 18th century. In essence, it prevents any change from being made to the pay and compensation of Senators and Representatives until after the next election. "Compensation" is the word used in the amendment to the constitution; it chiefly refers, I think, to salary, but its meaning could easily be extended to cover allowances and expenses. The amendment to the constitution requires that any such change should take effect only after the next intervening election.
	I think that we could adopt a similar system here. It would counter the charge that we are setting our own pay and allowances. As I have explained, I believe that the House ought to set such matters. A sovereign body should not transfer those matters to any other body. Under my amendment, we would not set pay and allowances for this Parliament and for ourselves; the change would take effect only after an election—after the implied endorsement of the electorate.

Dominic Grieve: I have a growing anxiety as I listen to the Secretary of State and watch his body language as he explains the provisions. Changing "rules" to "code" emphasises that the measures we passed a few weeks ago and that several hon. Members regard as completely flawed—I shall explain the reasons for that when I speak to my amendments—will, the moment the Bill is on the statute book, be subject to all the pains and penalties, including criminal offences in so far as they refer to financial matters, in clause 9. Should we not concentrate on that? On the one hand, the Government tell us that they have abandoned the conduct provisions in clause 6—to which we all say, "Hooray"—but on the other hand, and with some slight sideways movement, the Secretary of State attempts to lull us into accepting an unsatisfactory state of affairs, with potentially catastrophic consequences for individual Members.

Charles Walker: I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young). I entered the House of Commons four years ago, and it is a complete madhouse. We are now on our fourth iteration of the Green Book since I got here. The rules have changed on a quarterly basis, and now they are changing on an almost fortnightly basis. We have codes there, codes there—codes everywhere. We are seeing almost a deliberate attempt to criminalise every Member of Parliament, because it is now impossible to keep up with what the Government are doing.

Gerald Howarth: I rise to support amendment 73, which is excellent, and I also agree with everything that my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) said. He was absolutely right that what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the Government gander. However, with the economy in meltdown and our armed forces engaged in a battle in Afghanistan, it is astonishing that this House should spend so much time on this matter. It is true that there is public concern about expenses and that we had to address that, but the Government have come forward with a completely irrelevant issue relating to Members' interests. There is no clamour for the complex proposals that they have introduced save among the ardent socialists on his own Benches, and there are not too many of them.
	This provision bears all the hallmarks of a nasty, petty and partisan attempt by the Prime Minister to stoke up hostility towards some on the Conservative Benches, although it will have the added advantage of dragging in some of his right hon. and Blairite Friends whose services clearly are valued by a number of corporations and individuals out there in the public sector. I look at the right hon. Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram), a good friend of mine. I am so glad that he has been properly remunerated for his great talents and skills. If this were not an attempt to stoke up hostility, the Government would have accepted the case for bringing Ministers within the scope of the Bill. If the Prime Minister were not minded to be so venomous about it, logic would demand that Ministers should be brought into its scope. They spend infinitely more time than most of us who have outside interests on doing things other than looking after their constituents. There is therefore no justification for excluding Ministers. I did not think that the Justice Secretary's little example supported his case.
	This draconian measure will impose enormous added burdens on right hon. and hon. Members. We will be required to fill in some sort of time sheet, rather like lawyers, totting up how much time we spend on other interests. We have already seen how Members have fallen foul of the requirement to register interests, not in most cases because they have been dishonourable or evil, but simply as a result of the pressures on time. It is monstrous that the Government have proposed this complex web of requirements to impose on us.
	Failure to record interests accurately will render us all liable to criminal prosecution. It is important that we put it on record that there should be right hon. and hon. Members who have other interests. It is extremely important for Labour Members for, if they do not have other interests, they will be unemployed after the next general election.
	This House, as some commentators have noted, does not have enough people with business experience to inform debates in this place. It is left to those with experience in the other place to amend legislation that is pushed through here by people who do not have experience. I have checked with the House of Commons Library and, as matters stand, 7 per cent. of Labour Members have business experience and 38 per cent. of Conservative Members do. It is an indictment of Parliament that so few people have business experience. Therefore, I encourage all hon. Members to have outside interests. It adds to the value of debates in the House.
	I conclude by reminding the Committee of a remark made by the Bishop of Durham in another place. He said during debates on constitutional reform:
	"it looks as though constitutional change has been done on a wing and a prayer. We on these Benches are very happy to supply the prayer, but we want to be assured of the quality of the wing."—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 11 June 2009; Vol. 711, c. 767.]
	What the Justice Secretary's action tonight has demonstrated is that the wing is not qualified and is indeed plummeting to earth rapidly.

Bernard Jenkin: I endorse much of what my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) said about amendment 73, and what my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) said. Let me set out the strongest case for Ministers being brought into the scope of the rules on declarations. Just imagine what the inclusion of Ministers would show. If the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) were now the Foreign Secretary, it would probably show that he spent 80 or 90 per cent. of his working time being Foreign Secretary. I do not know how many hours he spends being Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice; I would submit that that must account for 70 or 75 per cent. of his working time. That would seem to be a reasonable proportion of his time to spend on ministerial office. For that, he is justifiably rewarded with extra salary as a Cabinet Minister. I appreciate that he does not draw the Lord Chancellor's salary. The inclusion of Ministers in the rules on declaration would, at a stroke, legitimate the view that other Members of Parliament without ministerial office would be perfectly justified in taking outside employment for a number of hours for a degree of extra remuneration.
	The failure to include Ministers in the rules on declaration seems deliberately to suggest that being a Minister is legitimate, but having a different outside interest, even if it is for the public good, is not legitimate. An invidious atmosphere has been created on the subject of outside interests. That was obviously political, and had absolutely nothing to do with the exposure of the expenses of right hon. and hon. Members by  The Daily Telegraph and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It was a purely vindictive and political act for the Prime Minister to bring that extra resolution before the House. It was done to create that political atmosphere.
	In parenthesis and perhaps not entirely relevantly, I might add that it has always struck me as slightly odd that a Member of Parliament resigns by accepting an office of profit under the Crown. I have never understood why being a Minister does not count as having an office of profit under the Crown. If we are to go on professionalising the House of Commons, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. Goodman) said yesterday, we should chuck the Executive out of Parliament altogether, on the basis that to be a Minister is to hold an office of profit under the Crown. That should disqualify Ministers from being Members of the House of Commons.

Paul Goodman: Clearly, as I said yesterday, Members of the House are either elected representatives who are free to earn outside, or professional politicians who are not. It is with that thought that I shall address the clause and the amendments. As some hon. Members know, I have become convinced over a period that, unfortunately, the House is heading in the direction of professional politics. That, for better or for worse, is why I have decided not to stand again. I confess that when I made my decision, pessimist though I sometimes am, even I could not conceive of a clause as poor as clause 5.
	Let me explain my reasoning. First, the Secretary of State has said consistently, throughout the proceedings on the Bill, that we need the Bill in order to quell public anxiety over expenses, but it ought to be obvious to every Member of the House, including those who have just entered it, that the clause has nothing at all to do with expenses. It is to do with the declaration of financial interests. If the Secretary of State had wanted a Bill concerned merely with expenses, he could have had it quickly yesterday and that would have been an end to it. But no, we have to have this Bill and this clause.
	The clause places before us a series of rules that will apparently be replaced by a code. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) have just been through all the arguments, and it is not ultimately clear whether "rules" is to be replaced by "code"—the most likely explanation is that the Prime Minister has promised a code and that is an end of it—or, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex just argued, whether the courts will be given the power to rule on the clause, thereby obviating the removal from the Bill of clause 6, which was offered to us as a concession yesterday.
	Furthermore, I do not know what will replace clause 5(8), if anything. Some Members may know because the Justice Secretary has been scurrying back and forth to speak to them. However, we do know what remains and looks likely to be punishable by the courts under clause 9. Nevertheless, we do not even know whether what the Bill seeks to give effect to, namely the provision whereby we have to declare in detail every hour that we work outside this place, will stand or be replaced by whatever Sir Christopher Kelly brings forth.
	I thought I heard the Secretary of State say this afternoon that, if Sir Christopher comes forth in due course and says, "I do not much like any of this," it may all have to be replaced anyway. I thought also that I heard my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex say that Sir Christopher, in conversation with him, seemed to intimate that he was not happy with every aspect of the Bill, raising the further question why it exists and why the clause exists.
	Underneath that tangled mess, which is so tangled that my description is even more tangled that it normally would be, lies a simplicity. As other hon. Members have said, the Government are creating an atmosphere of illegitimacy around outside interests. That is the purpose of clauses 5 and 9, and the ceiling that has been descending year upon year on outside interests, ever since the Nolan report and probably further back, is being ratcheted down under this Bill. It is essentially unjust, because the one group of people who will not have to declare how much time they spend working on business other than those of their constituents are, of course, Ministers. If there were any justice, they would accept the amendment tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends, so that Ministers had to declare how many hours they spent moonlighting outside this place—to use the language that they frequently throw at us. But of course, they will not accept it.
	Either we are to be elected representatives who are free to work or, if we are to be professional politicians, we will have to separate the Executive and the legislature, and being an MP will be a full-time job. I do not expect the Justice Secretary to address that argument fully or completely openly. I understand why the Leader of the House cannot be present, but, notably, the Justice Secretary has been sent in because, with his usual combination of charm and cunning, he is the only Front-Bench spokesperson likely to get the Bill past unsuspecting Government Members who, if they are still here after the next election, will find that it bites as much on them as on any other Member.
	My closing words, however, are not to the Justice Secretary but to my Front-Bench team. If, as may be, there is a Conservative Government after the next election, they are going to inherit this mess, and they are going to have to make a fundamental decision themselves, despite all the political difficulties. The question is, are they going to allow the boat to continue to drift all the way down to the professionalisation of politics, or are they going to make a stand and allow this House to return to what it should be—namely, a forum in which the clash of interests is represented and debated? If this House does not do that, there is no purpose in it being here at all.

Amendments made: 75, page 3, line 20, leave out "rules regularly and revise them" and insert
	"code regularly and revise it".
	Amendment 76, page 3, line 21, leave out "rules" and insert "code".— (Mr.  Blizzard.)
	  Amendment made: 16, page 3, line 21, at end insert:
	"( ) the Speaker of the House of Commons". —(Sir George Young.)

The Second Deputy Chairman: Order. It is for the occupant of the Chair to take the voices on these occasions and to decide what to do. As far as I am concerned, the Ayes have it.
	 Amendments made: 27, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert
	"(ba) members of the House of Commons.".— (Alan Duncan.)
	 Amendment 2, page 3, line 25, leave out "IPSA" and insert "Speaker".— (Sir George Young.)
	 Amendment 77, page 3, line 25, leave out "rules" and insert "code".
	 Amendment 78, page 3, line 26, leave out subsection (6) and insert
	"(6) The code (or revision) does not come into effect until it is approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.".
	Amendment 79, page 3, line 28, leave out "rules" and insert "code".— (Mr. Watts.)
	 Amendment 7, page 3, line 30, leave out subsection (8).— (Sir George Young.)
	 Amendment 82, page 3, line 42, leave out "rules" and insert "code".— (Mr. Straw.)
	 Amendment 29, page 4, line 2, after "or", insert "specified".
	 Amendment 30, page 4, line 4, after "or", insert "specified".— (Mr. Grieve.)
	  Amendment proposed: 73, page 4, line 16, at end add
	"(c) to payment as, and hours worked as, a Minister.". —(Alan Duncan.)

That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 7084/09 and Addendum 1, Commission Communication for the Spring European Council on Driving European Recovery, and No. 10511/09 and Addenda 1 and 2, Commission Communication on European financial supervision; and endorses the Government's approach to the next stages of discussions on how to restore and maintain a stable and reliable financial system.— ( Mr. Watts .) 
	 Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 25),
	 That this House, at its rising on Tuesday 21 July 2009, do adjourn till Monday 12 October 2009.— (Mr. Watts.)
	 The Deputy Speaker's opinion as to the decision of the Question being challenged, the Division was deferred until Wednesday 1 July (Standing Order No. 41A).

Ian Liddell-Grainger: I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to debate the Standards Board for England. For those hon. Members who have never come across it, let me say with great sincerity, "Lucky you!" The board is supposed to promote high ethical standards for local government, but in my experience it is an inefficient, expensive and woefully unfair outfit that should be confined to the history books as quickly as possible.
	The Standards Board was established on a whim of political correctness. The driving force behind it was that master of oratory, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott). He wanted local councillors to behave properly. That is a perfectly worthy goal, but the right hon. Gentleman could be clumsy; he loved to interfere in the natural order of things—and I suspect he still does. So instead of leaving it to the common sense of voters not to elect lunatics, or the common sense of the police to get involved when they had to, the right hon. Gentleman decided to reinvent the wheel. It was a triumph; the wheel was completely square. That is the sad story of the birth of the Standards Board.
	It was guaranteed to malfunction because it was designed by idiots. It has turned the act of complaining about councillors into a fabulous spectator sport. Imagine the centre court at Wimbledon where anyone can take a pot shot. That is the system the right hon. Gentleman created: "Complaints are free; why not make one now?"
	Several councillors from Bideford in north Devon are still under investigation because they want to scrap prayers before meetings to save time—hallelujah! Do we need to learn the lesson? Even in this place, where one would think we would all know better, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) recently reported a Lib Dem councillor to the Standards Board for the appalling act of removing a petition from a local post office.
	Last year, there were 3,500 different complaints—one for every waking hour of every single day. We are getting this wrong. If there are too many complaints, the staff cannot handle them, which means more people have to be hired and everything slows down. There is only one thing worse than slow justice, and that is no justice. The Standards Board offers both in heaps. It has become an overblown, bureaucratic kangaroo court. It pretends to operate like the Old Bailey, but people should not expect a fair trial, or any help in defending themselves.
	The Standards Board has set new standards, and they come in at gutter height. I could illustrate this argument with any number of high profile cases, but I prefer to stick to the one I know best. It concerns a former Somerset county councillor called Paul Buchanan. Adjournment debate groupies may recognise his name—I am sure the Minister does. The case of Paul Buchanan has dragged on for more than two painful years. I have raised it in this House on several occasions. Paul Buchanan was deputy leader of Somerset council's Liberal Democrats. What happened to him speaks volumes about what is wrong with the Standards Board.
	The board was bamboozled and brow-beaten into investigating Paul Buchanan, and all because of one unscrupulous public official: the chief executive of Somerset county council, Mr. Alan Jones. On 4 April 2007, Alan Jones composed a six-page letter of complaint about Paul Buchanan and sent it to the Standards Board for England. It was the work of a deliberate assassin. Paul Buchanan was accused of secretiveness, undermining staff, aggression, threatening behaviour, rudeness, intimidation, anger, disrespect, fraud, sexism, racism, homophobia, and abuse of his office as an elected councillor; not bad for one man—he is almost unique. There is barely concealed hatred of the man in every sentence. Jones did not just want the Standards Board to investigate; he wanted an instant political execution. He asked for then councillor Paul Buchanan to be suspended there and then, but he did not get that.
	The jobsworths at the Standards Board might have been forgiven for thinking that Paul Buchanan was an unstable nutcase with homicidal tendencies. In fact, the really unstable and unsavoury character was, and is, the complainant: Somerset county council's most senior officer. However, wrongly—inexcusably—the Standards Board does not investigate complaints against officers; it cannot. That is another ridiculous gaping hole in its half-baked interpretation of justice.
	If anyone's local chief executive is caught bullying staff or paying off his mistress from public funds, the Standards Board will rightly say it is none of its business; it can only investigate councillors, and it was obliged, because of the rules, to launch a full-blown inquiry into Mr. Buchanan. Hundreds of interviews were conducted and thousands of pages of transcripts were churned off the printers, and when it rejected Alan Jones's first batch of complaints, he wasted extra time querying its decision. It was dealing with a deranged obsessive. The first investigator retired, exhausted, halfway through and lawyers came and went. Heaven knows what the cost is—we certainly do not. What was the result? Eventually, 16 of the original complaints were chucked out, four others were referred to a higher court, not a proper court, but another quango; a panel with the pomp of the legal system, but—I say this in this place—none of the fairness. That meant even more uncertainty for Paul Buchanan.
	The panel— with a new bench of barristers—finally met in Somerset, and I went along to watch this gladiatorial sport. Key witnesses were called, but few, if any, turned up—most, understandably, did not want to have anything to do with it. The panel upheld one tiny charge: the heinous charge for which Paul Buchanan should have been dragged out and hung was that he had been overheard swearing under his breath. Is that pathetic or was it the crime of the century? I shall let you decide that one, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
	What was really behind all this? Why on earth did a chief executive who was earning £160,000 year and who had 17,000 staff and huge responsibilities go to so much trouble to make complaints about what was seen as an ambitious councillor? Mr. Jones's explanation to the Standards Board was beyond belief; he said that Paul Buchanan's behaviour was
	"capable of damaging the council's continued improvement and external reputation".
	Whoop-de-doo!
	That statement would stack up only if the charges against Mr. Buchanan were proved, but they were not and he was acquitted of everything serious, other than the crime of the century of swearing under his breath. We should recall what he was accused of: secretiveness, undermining staff, aggression, threatening behaviour, rudeness, intimidation, anger, disrespect, fraud, sexism, racism, and homophobia. He was probably accused of leaving the loo seat up too. This was simply a personal vendetta.
	So why did Jones want to "get" Buchanan and what had Buchanan "got" on Jones? I am sorry if that sounds conspiratorial, but there is a big hint of conspiracy in all this. Mr. Buchanan knew too much. Back in 2005, there was gossip about Alan Jones having an affair with a member of staff called Jenny Hastings. Everybody at county hall knew about this—it was no secret. What Buchanan did not know was that when the affair came to an end Ms Hastings made a serious complaint of sexual harassment against Alan Jones. That is, of course, a sackable offence, and rightly so. The complaint had to be dealt with by a confidential panel of elected members, including the lady who led the council at the time. Halfway through she was taken ill—legitimately so—and Paul Buchanan, the acting leader, took over but he was never told about the inquiry. It was Alan Jones who let the cat out of the bag and he came to plead with Mr. Buchanan to help, but Mr. Buchanan rightly told Mr. Jones that he would not and could not help—big mistake. Unfortunately, Alan Jones has a long memory and he bears grudges.
	By the time the leader returned to work it was deemed too dangerous to punish Jones by sacking him—that is perhaps just one of those quirks. Unfortunately, Jenny Hastings was threatening an industrial tribunal, which is a very public way of exposing the antics of her lover, and the Audit Commission was due to inspect the council. There is nothing like a five-star sex scandal to scupper one's chances of an excellent four-star rating, as they say in the best adverts. So, behind closed doors, and with the help of ACAS, a deal was signed to buy Ms Hastings off—that cost £140,000, which is slightly less than the annual pay cheque of the chief executive. Some very large extra payments indeed were made, and in the next couple of years millions of pounds were spent on mysterious "staff restructuring" at Somerset county council.
	I do not know the answer to this and I know that the Minister does not either, but I wonder, and we must speculate, whether any of that money helped to buy the silence of those who knew the gory details. Were they given a golden goodbye when they retired?
	Paul Buchanan continued as deputy leader, taking a particular interest in the projects that were close to the chief executive's heart, but Mr. Buchanan is no fool. He was apt to ask too many difficult and complicated questions.
	The Minister will know of my interest in the development of a joint venture company between Somerset county council, Avon and Somerset Police and IBM—it is well known. The outfit is called Southwest One and I am afraid that it has made a complete hash of things in the county. The computer system does not work, and it cannot place orders or pay bills, let alone—and most importantly—save money for the county. Southwest One is a nightmare, and is the product of Alan Jones's dream of radically improving services.
	That is why the incoming Conservative administration—we had great success down there—immediately announced a full inquiry a few weeks ago into the whole sorry mess. They did so independently. The Jones philosophy was "anything goes", which explains how he was able to hire the wife of the Avon and Somerset chief constable to set the thing up in the first place. Sue Barnes, the chief constable's wife, became the Somerset project director without a formal interview and her hubby, Colin Port, is now on the board of Southwest One. I ask the House—is that right?
	Paul Buchanan was involved in assessing the merits of the commercial bidders back in 2006. He was—let us remind ourselves—the deputy leader of the council, and he does know one or two things about business. He is a successful businessman. There were three rivals: Capita; British Telecom, for which Mr. Jones got a consultancy in Somerset; and IBM. With millions at stake, such companies spend fortunes polishing their bids. Guess what? They twitch if anybody speaks out of turn. I am sure that we have all had experience of that.
	On 12 February 2007, Sue Barnes went to London with Paul Buchanan to meet IBM. My sources in the industry told me at the time that IBM was badly rattled—it thought that it was going to lose the bid. It had heard rumours that Alan Jones had been singing the praises of BT at a late-night drinking session at a conference of chief executives. I forgot to mention that "Big Al" likes to unwind with a glass in his hand and, dare I say it, a pretty woman, but this time he was overheard, unfortunately for him.
	Sue Barnes and Paul Buchanan had to go and see IBM and to pour oil on troubled waters so that IBM did not walk away. Otherwise, the whole project would have gone belly up. I have no problem with procurement projects—neither have the Government or the Opposition. We all agree on that point. Within a day or two of that meeting, Jones's attitude to Buchanan changed. He set out to destroy this man's opportunities.
	Jones sent a letter to the leader of the council about Buchanan's behaviour and persuaded four senior councillors to sign it. Then, the Lib Dems called a mate—Councillor Richard Kemp—from Liverpool, Mr. Jones's home town. Kemp, as a Liberal, is known as the Jackal. He is deadly, and Jones went to London to give him the ammunition—signed statements from people in and around his office alleging Buchanan's "unspeakable" behaviour. They were probably signed in their own blood, too, for all I know.
	I apologise to the House that I am forced to go into detail to explain this yet again, but I do not understand—and I am sure that the House does not—why a chief executive should be immersing himself in the political side of any council. That is not the job or the role of chief executives. They are meant to leave politics to the politicians—and rightly so. Somerset council, with a weak Lib Dem leader on her way out, thought that Mr. Jones could get away with anything and do what he liked. However, the Jackal came to Somerset with a cunning plan. If Buchanan quit as deputy leader, promised to shut up and to accept "mentoring", the charges would be dropped. Mr. Buchanan rightly said, "I'm not going to play." If he had agreed to the Jackal's plan, he would have been accepting his own guilt. As we have proved, he is not guilty of anything other than swearing under his breath.
	On 27 March 2007, the Government provided the assassin with a convenient smokescreen. It was the day that they published a list of councils that wanted to become unitary authorities. Unfortunately for us, Somerset was on the list. The Jackal reached for his weapon, fired off an e-mail and went to the Standards Board right away. This was where things came full circle. He wrote:
	"It is an ideal time to deal with this because of the Unitary News."
	Does that sound familiar? The Jackal was using the old adage, "It is a good day to bury bad news." No serious attempt was ever made to deal with Jones—that was what was meant to happen. Jones wanted to go to the Standards Board; the Jackal pulled the trigger. How times change.
	I am sure that many hon. Members will have read the letter from the Jackal that was sent to the relevant Minister some time ago. It is required reading. It is from a Lib Dem, in his own words. He said of the Standards Board:
	"There is no evidence that any of these boards have had any effect in improving behavioural standards. There is some evidence that they have encouraged people to make malicious claims about councillors."
	That is the Lib Dems' top man, the Jackal. It is a miracle—the very man who specialised in malicious claims against Paul Buchanan has suddenly been converted, falling off his ass on the road to Taunton! At last the Jackal has seen the error of his ways, but it is too late for Paul Buchanan. The very outfit that the Jackal now wants scrapped is still turning the screw.
	On 13 July the high court of the Standards Board, the adjudication panel, will meet to have another go at the allegations brought by Alan Jones. The nature of those allegations is quite extraordinary. We must remember that chief executives are immune from the Standards Board, so Mr. Buchanan decided to complain about the behaviour of his chief executive to Somerset county council. He wrote to the county solicitor and detailed a long list of shortcomings—womanising, drunkenness, bullying—and he gave chapter and verse, with all the dates and places. So what does "Big Al" do? He complains about the complaints, to—yes, the Standards Board!
	It is true. He says that he is being bullied because someone has complained about him being a bully. It gets better: the Standards Board was obliged, yet again, to call in more lawyers, do more interviews, produce more transcripts and waste more time and money.
	The House will be glad to hear that it will all come to a head on 13 July, at the Holiday Inn in Taunton. If people want to see a kangaroo court in action, there is space available and they should head down to Taunton. However, anyone expecting that the chief witness in this case would be none other than "Big Al" himself would be wrong. Mr. Cowardy Custard from county hall does not fancy being cross-examined, and I wonder why. He would much prefer to avoid all questions, about basically anything. He has reduced a tough TV producer to tears. I know, because she worked for ITV and she stopped on the motorway to ring me and complain.
	I am afraid that Mr. Jones' reputation is bad, but this time the kangaroo court that is the panel will not be asking him to attend. I think that that is appalling. In other words, Mr. Buchanan is expected to prove that he did not bully the chief executive without the chief executive showing up in court to give evidence, because he cannot be forced to do so. The panel might as well go back to the days of the ducking stool, and I think that we know what that feels like. A person is tied to a chair and lowered into a pond: if that person drowns, he or she is innocent; if not, he or she must be a witch and so gets executed. Good old Somerset!
	What makes it doubly ridiculous is that Paul Buchanan is no longer a councillor and never wants to be one again. And what is the worst punishment available to the panel? They can ban him from being a councillor, even though he is not one. This is all too much.
	The Standards Board has become a joke, and a very bad joke at that. It is about as much use as a fireproof match or an inflatable anchor. In a dotty effort to improve its awful public image, many of its powers have now been handed back to local councils, and that has made things much worse.
	If Paul Buchanan were a councillor today and fresh complaints were made about him by Alan Jones, then the judge and jury would be Alan Jones himself. Personally, I would not want to be cast away on a desert island with Mr. Jones. I quote again from the Jackal, who said:
	"The standard of decisions that are made by council officers...relating to standards issues is diabolically low".
	I shall leave it there, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as I need say no more.

Ian Austin: This debate gives me the opportunity to discuss the conduct regime for local authority members in general, and the work of the Standards Board for England and the Adjudication Panel for England in particular. It allows me to make clear the vital roles that both bodies have in ensuring that high standards of conduct are maintained by local authority members, and it also affords me the opportunity to put on record once again this Government's support for the conduct regime for local authority members, the Standards Board for England and the Adjudication Panel for England.
	The views of the hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Liddell-Grainger) about the Standards Board for England are a matter of record. Indeed, on 21 April he secured an Adjournment debate in which he spoke at length about the board. It is obviously a body that he feels strongly about, as he has taken the trouble to secure another Adjournment debate to discuss it again.
	I want to speak about the work of the Standards Board for England and the Adjudication Panel for England, but I should make it clear from the outset that I am not able to intervene in individual cases. It is right that this is so, as it guarantees the impartiality of both the conduct regime and the investigation process. Equally, I am not going to comment on, or engage in debate about, any specific ongoing issue.
	In this country, we have naturally high standards of probity, accountability and objectivity. Our expectations of behaviour demand a conduct regime that is serious, reasonable, robust and fair—fair to the public, and to all in public life. That applies as much to those elected to local authorities as it does to Members of this House.
	The conduct regime is underpinned by the code of conduct for local authority members, enforced through local authority standards committees and regulated by the Standards Board for England. It gives a clear ethical framework for local authority members to work within and makes clear to the electorate the standards of behaviour that they can expect from those whom they vote into office.
	In 2007 a revised model code of conduct for local authority members was issued, providing a yet clearer, simpler and more proportionate code for members. This code removed barriers to members being able to speak up for those whom they represent, for example on planning and licensing issues, and has been well received by the local government world. It is this code that all local authorities have followed in their own codes by which their members must abide.
	Late last year, my Department consulted on proposed revisions to the code of conduct. We have received over 1,000 responses to the consultation, clearly indicating the level of interest in this subject. We are in the process of finalising our consideration of the consultation responses, and the Government will be making their response to the consultation in due course. This same consultation asked for views on the possible introduction of a code of conduct for local authority employees, and I know that the hon. Gentleman showed interest in this matter the last time the conduct regime was debated here, as he has done again this evening.
	Of course, many local authorities already have their own codes of conduct, but introducing a model code, which would effectively be built into the terms and conditions of each local government employee, is not something to be done lightly or without extensive further consultation with the local government sector. I will not say more on this issue because I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the consultation process.
	In May last year, the Government fulfilled their White Paper commitment to introduce, as recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, a more locally based conduct regime for members and co-opted members of local authorities in England. Devolving responsibility for conduct issues to local authorities provides them with greater ownership of the conduct regime and local conduct issues and boosts their role in promoting and maintaining a culture of high standards of behaviour in local authorities. This belief is shared by the local government world.
	The Standards Board for England, which until this point had been responsible for investigating alleged breaches of the code of conduct, assumed its new responsibility as the strategic regulator of local authority standards committees, responsible for monitoring their performance and issuing guidance on the conduct regime. The Standards Board continues to investigate the most serious allegations of misconduct. So let us be clear that the regime in place accords with the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, including its recommendation of establishing a more locally based decision-making regime for the investigation and determination of all but the most serious of misconduct allegations, but with the Standards Board at the centre of the revised regime with a new strategic, regulatory role to ensure consistency of standards. If hon. Members are challenging this, they are challenging the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which recently approached the Standards Board for England for advice on how a successful, robust and transparent conduct regime operates.
	The Standards Board for England continues to grow in its new role as strategic regulator. Earlier this month it was granted powers to engage with local authorities where there was a problem with how the conduct regime is operating. The board has the ability to suspend the operation of a local authority standards committee, either taking on its operation itself or asking another local authority to do so, while the board works with the authority to resolve any problems prior to allowing the standards committee to begin functioning again.
	If, following the investigation of alleged misconduct, the allegation is founded and misconduct has occurred, it is usually the case that the standards committee of the local authority concerned determines how the misconduct is dealt with and what sanction to apply. Measures can extend from training for the party involved or having to make a simple apology, through to being suspended from office. If it is determined that the breach of the conduct regime is serious, then the standards committee or the Standards Board for England may refer the case to the Adjudication Panel for England for sanction.
	The Adjudication Panel for England is an independent judicial tribunal established by the Local Government Act 2000 as a disciplinary body to hear and determine references concerning the conduct of local authority councillors. The sanctions available to the panel include suspension from office or disqualification from office for up to five years. The panel may also simply choose to censure a councillor who has breached the code.
	Let me turn now the subject of investigations. Prior to the introduction of the new regime, it was for the Standards Board for England to assess and if necessary investigate the some 3,500 allegations made about the behaviour of councillors every year. Under the devolved regime, the Standards Board investigates only the most serious of allegations. I realise that the process can be trying for those who are subject to an allegation that takes some time to investigate and resolve. Investigations can become protracted for a number of reasons. Some cases are complex and require the collection of evidence from a number of witnesses. In addition, fresh evidence may come to light during the investigative process. Unfortunately, we must also consider the fact that investigation can be protracted by the malicious behaviour of the subject or subjects of the allegation, who may have reason to fear the outcome of the investigation.
	Serious allegations merit thorough investigation, and where the finding is that there has been a serious breach of the code of conduct, the Adjudication Panel for England will issue the appropriate sanction. Since December 2008, an ethical standards officer at the Standards Board for England has had the power to withdraw cases that have been referred to the Adjudication Panel for hearing in certain specific circumstances. They might do so, for example, when the matter is revealed to be less serious than it had first appeared. Of course, circumstances may change between a matter being referred to the Adjudication Panel and a hearing of the panel. For instance, a local authority member may stand down or may lose his or her seat in a local authority election. However, that in itself is no reason to not go ahead with a hearing by the panel.
	There is a clear public interest argument to be made. If a local authority member breaks the code, they should not be able to walk away from the consequences of their actions simply by resigning, or losing, their seat. The Adjudication Panel has powers, including the power to ban a person from being a local authority member in any local authority for up to five years, for a reason. Such a sanction prevents somebody from simply standing down and then standing elsewhere, or indeed standing again in the same authority. In addition, that power gives an assurance to whoever brought the allegation that they will see redress if the case requires it. Let us also remember that the panel deals with serious breaches of the code. Issues such as bullying can have a real impact on people's lives, and it is right that such behaviour should be addressed.
	It is important that a member who ceases to be a councillor should have the opportunity to clear their name of a serious allegation. That is why we consider it important that an investigation into allegations should move to a conclusion, unless there is a good reason why the process should cease. An essential part of investigation is the collection of evidence, and I would like to take this opportunity to address the issue of evidence and the public domain. To be clear, evidence transcripts are not in the public domain. Witnesses will have the opportunity to check their transcripts, and the member who is the subject of the investigation will have the opportunity to see all transcripts, if they form part of the evidence bundle, in order to check for accuracy.
	When the evidence is provided, all those concerned are reminded of their obligations under section 63 of the Local Government Act 2000, which requires that information obtained by the Standards Board's ethical standards officers during an investigation is not to be disclosed unless one or more specific conditions, such as consent by the individuals concerned, are met. Anyone disclosing information in contravention of the Act is guilty of an offence. At a hearing, the public are not given transcripts. If they make a request, they are given a summary of relevant evidence, and some of the information from the transcripts may be in that summary. The summary itself will be referred to in open hearing.
	Let us be clear that the vast majority of local authority members observe the high standards of behaviour that the electorate rightly expect from them, but a robust conduct regime is absolutely necessary to provide redress when the code of conduct is not observed. The Standards Board for England needs to be there not just to provide regulation for the standards committees that enforce the code of conduct, but to continue to supply advice, support and training to local authority members to ensure that they continue to work within the conduct regime.
	Finally, we absolutely understand that investigations, and their outcomes, affect the lives of all those concerned in them. We know that politicians trade in the currency of trust, and that trust is hard to build and harder to regain. However, we are also convinced of the need for a conduct regime that is robust, reasonable and proportionate, and that provides a framework to work within, and an enforcement method to deal with those who are guilty of misconduct. A robust, fair and transparent conduct regime is vital to maintain confidence in democracy, just as the Standards Board for England is vital to the conduct regime.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 House adjourned.